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THE 2004 GENERAL ELECTIONS 
IN MALAYSIA
 
A Mandate to Rule
 
Abdul Rashid Moten and 
Tunku Mohar Mokhtar
Abstract
 
The ruling coalition in Malaysia received an overwhelming mandate to rule in
the general elections held in 2004. The major opposition party, which ran an
aggressive campaign for an Islamic agenda, suffered a crushing defeat. The
election results can be seen as an endorsement of Prime Minister Abdullah’s
style of moderate governance.
Keywords: Malaysia, 2004 elections, Badawi factor, Islam, fractured opposition,
Barisan Nasional
 
Malaysia is a relative newcomer to the world of the dem-
ocratic nation-state. It was only in 1963 that the Federation of Malaysia emerged
fully from the yoke of British colonialism. In less than 50 years, Malaysia has
established a functioning democratic state that has managed to unite various
cultural and religious groups and has made significant progress on the march
toward developed-nation status.
Malaysia operates a federal parliamentary system with the king, known as
the Yang Di-Pertuan Agong, as the constitutional head. It has a bicameral Par-
liament composed of a 69-member, largely non-elected, upper house (Dewan
Negara) and a popularly elected House of Representatives (Dewan Rakyat). The
Dewan Rakyat consists of 219 members elected from single-member districts
by universal suffrage. Each of Malaysia’s 13 states has a legislature elected in
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the same manner. The country’s Constitution stipulates that parliamentary and
state elections be held every five years. It also empowers the king, on the
advice of the prime minister, to dissolve Parliament and thus undertake fresh
elections. The Constitution provides for an independent Election Commission
(EC) with the authority to conduct elections. Since independence in 1957, Ma-
laysia’s commitment to democracy has been indicated by the fact that it has
conducted 10 general elections at the national and state levels with a high de-
gree of public participation. Before the 2004 elections, the previous polls were
held on November 29, 1999.
On March 4, 2004, Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi advised the con-
stitutional monarch to dissolve the House of Representatives, paving the way
for the eleventh national elections. The government’s five-year term was set to
expire that November, but early polls had been expected since former Prime
Minister Mahathir Mohamad voluntarily stepped down in October 2003. Ab-
dullah’s United Malays National Organization (UMNO), which has supplied
every prime minister since Malaysia’s founding, leads a 14-party ruling coali-
tion known as Barisan Nasional (National Front, BN). It was widely expected
that the elections would extend BN’s 50-year-long rule and reverse gains that
the party’s biggest rival, the Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (Pan-Malaysian Islamic
Party, PAS), made in the last elections. In 1999, five BN ministers were de-
feated and its share of the Malay vote shrank from 63% to 49%, but BN won
148 of the 193 parliamentary seats. Since that time, BN obtained three ad-
ditional seats when Parti Bersatu Sabah (United Sabah Party, PBS) joined
the coalition in January 2002 and another by winning the Pendang seat in a
by-election that July. Prior to the dissolution of Parliament and the state assem-
blies, PAS held 26 parliamentary seats and 98 state seats, the Democratic Ac-
tion Party (DAP) had 10 parliamentary and 11 state seats, and Parti Keadilan
Nasional (National Justice Party, KeADILan) controlled five parliamentary and
five state seats.
 
1
 
In precipitating the 2004 elections, Abdullah, who took office on October
31, 2003, was seeking his first mandate. With Parliament dissolved, nomina-
tions for parliamentary and state assembly seats were held on March 13, 2004,
and elections took place March 21. The intervening eight days were used for
campaigning. The political parties, in fact, had been actively campaigning in
various ways for some time: according to the EC chairman, over the previous
four years the police had issued 11,692 permits to political parties to conduct
campaign-related activities.
 
2
 
1. See Abdul Rashid Moten, “The 1999 General Elections in Malaysia: Toward a Stable De-
mocracy?” in 
 
Akademika 
 
57 (July 2000), pp. 67–86.
2.
 
Sunday Straits Times
 
, March 14, 2004.
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The Redelineation Exercise
 
At stake in the eleventh general elections were 219 parliamentary and 505
state legislative assembly seats (excluding the Sarawak state legislative assem-
bly).
 
3
 
 Compared to the 1999 general elections, this means an increase of 26
parliamentary and 111 state seats. The increase in the number of parliamen-
tary constituencies was prompted by a redelineation of district lines carried
out by the EC in 2003. The increase in the state seats derived from the new
state assembly constituencies and the inclusion of the 60 Sabah state assembly
seats. For the first time in its history, the state of Sabah held its parliamentary
and state assembly elections simultaneously with Peninsular Malaysian states.
Article 113 (1 and 2) of the Malaysian Federal Constitution provides for an
EC that—in addition to running elections—is also empowered to keep electoral
rolls and review constituencies. The Constitution also contains the principle of
“rural weightage.” A rural vote counts for more than an urban vote because on
the whole, rural constituencies contain fewer electors. The political significance
of this “weightage” is that it ensures domination of the system by ethnic Malays
because the rural areas are predominantly Malay. For instance, of the 26 newly
created parliamentary seats, 21 are in the peninsula and the remaining five
in Sabah. Of the 21 seats, 13 are Malay-majority seats and two are Chinese-
majority; in the remaining six seats no ethnic group forms a majority although
the Malays are the largest plurality.
 
4
 
The redelineation, announced by the EC on August 9, 2002, has increased
the number of Malay-majority parliamentary constituencies. Nevertheless, of
13 new Malay-majority constituencies, only three had more than 80% Malay
voters. On the other hand, there were only five out of 21 new constituencies
where the Chinese constitute less than 20% of the voters. This points to a
pattern of increased mixed constituencies, a situation in which BN performed
well in the past two general elections. Although the redelineation does not di-
rectly affect electoral outcomes, it does increase BN’s chances in these new
constituencies.
 
5
 
The opposition parties, as usual, complained of gerrymandering. They com-
plained that the redelineation of electoral boundaries, concluded in 2003, re-
sulted in the creation of additional seats, especially in the semi-urban areas
where BN had performed extremely well in 1999. No additional parliamentary
 
3. For the 2004 general elections, only 505 seats were contested. The Sarawak state assembly,
which has 62 seats, held its state election in 2001, and the next one is due in 2006.
4. Authors’ calculation based on 
 

 
http://www.undi.info
 

 
, accessed March 3, 2004; and the
 
Sunday Star
 
, March 14, 2004.
5. See, inter alia, K. Ong, “The 2002 Delimitation Exercise: Systematically Favoring the BN?”
in 
 
Aliran Monthly
 
 22:8 (2002); and Lim Hong Hai, “New Rules and Constituencies for New Chal-
lenges,” ibid., 23:6 (2003), pp. 7–9.
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seats were added to Kelantan, Terengganu, or Kedah states where PAS had
scored huge successes. Instead, Sabah got an additional five seats, Johor an-
other six, Selangor five, Pahang three, and Penang two. In these states also,
BN had performed well in 1999. Moreover, the electoral boundaries were re-
drawn in two of the four Malay heartland states in the north, Kelantan and
Kedah. Major changes have also been made to Perak’s electoral boundaries.
All these changes have benefited BN. The opposition parties complained to
the EC with no positive outcome.
 
Candidates and the Parties
 
A total of 448 candidates contested the 219 seats in the Dewan Rakyat. Of
these candidates, 219 belonged to the ruling BN and 198 to various opposition
parties. The remaining 31 ran as independent candidates. For the 505 state leg-
islative assemblies, political parties nominated 1,017 candidates, while 89 ran
as independents.
BN alone could nominate candidates for all the parliamentary and state
seats. PAS filed the largest number of candidates with 86 for parliamentary
seats and 262 for state assembly seats, followed closely by KeADILan with 58
and 118, respectively. DAP nominated 44 for the parliamentary seats and 106
for the state assembly seats. Parti Demokratik Setiasehati Kuasa Rakyat Ber-
satu Sabah (Sabah United People’s Democratic Party, SETIA) fielded one par-
liamentary and 14 state assembly candidates. The Malaysian Democratic Party
(MDP) ran one parliamentary candidate in the Federal Territory of Kuala Lum-
pur. Of the two Sarawak-based parties, the Sarawak National Party (SNAP)
nominated seven candidates and the State Reform Party (STAR) nominated
one for parliamentary seats. The parties fielded no candidates at the state level
because Sarawak did not hold elections for state seats in conjunction with
those of other states. Parti Barisan Rakyat Sabah Bersekutu (Sabah United
People’s Front, Bersekutu), a Sabah-based party, did not take part in parlia-
mentary elections but nominated 12 candidates for state assembly seats.
 
6
 
 Of
the total nominated candidates, 99 were women. About RM 15.6 million ($4.1
million) worth of deposits were collected on Nomination Day.
 
7
 
Interestingly, 186 parliamentary and 434 state seats saw direct one-to-one
contests. A total of 12 parliamentary and 39 state assembly constituencies had
three candidates each. In other words, in these constituencies the BN candidate
was challenged by two opposition candidates. In the state of Sabah, there were
nine parliamentary and 22 state constituencies where the number of contestants
 
6.
 
Sunday Star
 
, March 14, 2004
7. A deposit is a cash bond that must be lodged by candidates with the EC, to be returned if
they achieve one-eighth of the total number of votes polled by all the candidates in the constitu-
ency, otherwise it is forfeited.
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exceeded three, and in one state constituency, eight contestants ran. This
was because of the mushrooming of local parties and an increasing number of
independent candidates.
BN is a multiethnic alliance but also constitutes a party in its own right.
 
8
 
 It
has its own constitution; in elections it behaves like a single party by putting
forward a common team of candidates contesting under a single banner. Given
the plural nature of Malaysian society, political leaders of various ethnic groups
have opted for a consensus politics through the formation of BN.
 
9
 
 UMNO is
the dominant party, followed by the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), the
Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), and other smaller parties. As a ruling coa-
lition representing various ethnic groups, BN professes multiculturalism; within
the coalition, each party safeguards the ethnic interests it represents. Candi-
dates for office are nominated through a complicated process of seat-sharing.
The time-tested formula behind the distribution of seats is that the parties will
not field candidates against each other and each will contest where it is most
likely to win. After its not-so-impressive victory in 1999, BN has strengthened
and emerged into a more cohesive force. The coalition’s two major Chinese
parties, MCA and Parti Gerakan Rakyat (Malaysian People Movement, Gera-
kan), which had subtly undermined each other in the last elections, have buried
their differences, holding joint Chinese New Year and unity gatherings and
campaigning together. MCA has changed leaders from Dr. Ling Liong Sik to
Ong Ka Ting.
Among the opposition, PAS is a Malay-based Islamic party with a commit-
ment to its goal of establishing an Islamic state. PAS has won the support of
the predominantly Malay Muslim voters in the northern states. In an effort to
reach out for non-Malay support, a week before the dissolution of Parliament the
PAS president organized a PAS supporters club composed of non-Muslims,
mainly Chinese.
 
10
 
 In the 1999 elections PAS headed the opposition coalition
known as Barisan Alternatif (Alternative Front, BA) that included KeADILan,
DAP, and Parti Rakyat Malaysia (Malaysian People’s Party, PRM).
KeADILan was launched on April 4, 1999, with Dr. Wan Azizah Wan Ismail,
the wife of former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, as its president.
According to Wan Azizah, “We want to be a bridge between existing parties.
We will cooperate with all political parties that champion the cause of justice
and make right the wrongs in our system.”
 
11
 
 The party promised a just and
 
8. See Donald Horowitz, 
 
Ethnic Groups in Conflict
 
 (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1985).
9. See Diane K. Mauzy, 
 
Barisan Nasional: Coalition Government in Malaysia 
 
(Kuala Lumpur:
Marican and Sons, 1983).
10.
 
New Straits Times
 
, June 1, 1999.
11.
 
Asiaweek
 
, April 16, 1999, p. 21.
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democratic administration, accountability, transparency, and rule of law in Ma-
laysia and genuine multiethnic, multireligious cooperation and unity. In the 2004
elections, KeADILan formed an alliance with PAS that came to be known as
the BA. Unlike BN, which is a registered party, BA is simply an understanding
between the two parties and has no legal status.
DAP is professedly a non-communal party with a commitment to achieve a
“Malaysian Malaysia.” It is strongly identified with the predominantly urban
Chinese and has difficulty obtaining support from other groupings. Yet, the party
did nominate Indian and Malay candidates in the 2004 elections. In the 1999
elections, DAP formed part of the opposition coalition but withdrew from BA in
September 2001 as a protest against the Islamic-state agenda propagated by PAS.
 
Campaign Strategies
 
Campaigning for the eleventh general elections actually started long before
the national parliament was dissolved. Officially, however, the election cam-
paign period covered only eight days in March 2004, the shortest such period
in Malaysia’s electoral history—perhaps in an effort to reduce the level of open
political competition and thus contain ethnic sentiments from erupting into vi-
olence. The short period meant, however, that BN, with its extensive organiza-
tion, control of the media, and massive funding, could convey its viewpoints to
the electorate more effectively than any opposition party could. Campaigning
assumed four major forms: poster wars, small group discussions (
 
ceramah
 
) or
political rallies, door-to-door efforts, and electronic means including use of
the Internet and mobile phone companies’ short message services (SMS).
Posters, leaflets, and billboards appeared frequently throughout the country.
The flags and banners of BN could be seen everywhere. The party erected some
3,000 billboards at strategically chosen roundabouts and junctions and along
highways across Malaysia. The theme of BN’s advertising blitz was “Clean”
(meaning no blatant or crude attacks), “Soft” (meaning subtle), and “Kind”
(meaning gentle and informative). This was in sharp contrast to the 1999 gen-
eral election, when agencies hired to make the commercials used a “sledge-
hammer” approach in dealing with political opponents. This time Abdullah
reportedly insisted on a clean campaign. BN billboards highlighted the achieve-
ments of the coalition government and profiled the prime minister distributing
food to the poor and kissing and hugging orphans and the needy.
Although PAS, DAP, and KeADILan did take part in the poster wars, their
flags and leaflets were only visible in and around election operation centers.
Opposition candidates, in several interviews with the authors, admitted that
they had printed their posters late and were constrained by limited resources.
Parties also bought advertising space in newspapers. Once again, BN had an
edge because it controls major Malaysian media outlets. Almost the entire print
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media, plus radio stations and television channels, devoted much of their news
programs and election coverage to promoting the government’s achievements.
Over the eight-day campaign, BN bought approximately 1,100 pages of full-page
colored ads in all local newspapers. The opposition used their own bimonthly
and monthly magazines to reach out to the people. BN took the campaigning
one step further by placing large helium-filled balloons with the BN logo atop
high-rise structures where they could be spotted from a distance.
In addition, the contesting parties made greater use of the Internet than pre-
viously to reach the voters. Many political parties had created their own web-
sites long before the elections were announced. For the opposition parties,
which get little mainstream media coverage, the Internet provides access to a
wider audience. UMNO and MCA maintain interactive websites that provide
details about party history, programs, and major political news breaks. Simi-
larly, PAS, DAP, and KeADILan offer well-designed websites with much in-
formation about party policies and programs. Websites such as Malaysiakini,
Aliran.com, Agendadaily, and several others provide a medley of news up-
dates on current affairs and a forum for debate on issues in Malaysian politics
and economy.
Political parties had also made extensive use of mobile phone services.
KeADILan, DAP, and the Youth and Puteri (lit., princess) wings of UMNO,
among others, campaigned by SMS.
 
12
 
 UMNO Youth and the Puteri wings cre-
ated a special SMS campaign called the SMS Blast System to endear BN can-
didates to voters. Among the opposition, PAS offered information services via
SMS for 50 sen (13 cents) per message. The money was donated to the pov-
erty fund of 
 
Harakah
 
 (Movement), PAS’s bimonthly publication. Recipients of
messages received the headlines and lead paragraphs of 
 
Harakah
 
’s top stories
daily and notices about the time and venue of 
 
ceramah.
 
The parties also used 
 
ceramah
 
 to reach out to and feel the pulse of the
people. Most of the 
 
ceramah
 
 were held on open ground; some targeted spe-
cific groups of about 100 to 200 people. The 
 
ceramah
 
 were usually held at night.
Compared to 1999, 
 
ceramah
 
 in the 2004 election were few and largely devoid
of high-spirited public speeches. This might have been because of EC’s con-
stant reminders about the Election Offenses Act of 1954 that forbade personal
attacks, character assassination, and inciting of religious and racial sentiments.
Most parties preferred door-to-door campaigning. Dressed simply, candidates
visited houses and marketplaces, distributing free food and supplies while ex-
plaining their stands and soliciting votes. The participants took the elections
 
12. Puteri UMNO was created in 1999, with its membership open to Malay women aged 18 to
35. Its major aim is to gain support from young Malay voters, who were perceived to be more inclined
toward the opposition.
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seriously, spending massive amounts of money mobilizing voters and organiz-
ing polls and demonstrating considerable faith in the legitimacy of electoral
politics.
 
Campaign Issues
 
The BN campaign was based on the promise of a better future. The party’s 15-
page glossy pamphlet described BN as moving “Toward Excellence, Glory,
and Distinction.”
 
13
 
 The manifesto stated that under BN-rule Malaysia has seen
political stability, economic development, and racial harmony. The country re-
mains free to form its own political and economic systems and to overcome
socioeconomic problems through the process of consultation. The document
sets out BN’s plan to strengthen the economy, chiefly by turning agriculture,
biotechnology, and Islamic financial services into new sources of wealth. BN
pledged to improve (a) service at all front-line agencies, (b) integrity of the
police force through an independent royal commission, and (c) the level of
personal safety for every individual. BN asserted it would ensure production
of high caliber graduates and improve integration among students. In the reli-
gious sphere, BN pledged to promote Islam Hadhari (Progressive Islam), im-
prove application of 
 
shari’ah
 
 laws, and ensure that Muslim women have access
to a fair and just legal system.
BN’s manifesto also states: “Barisan Nasional is unique because it repre-
sents all ethnic groups in Malaysia. All groups have a stake in Malaysia’s de-
velopment. This makes Barisan Nasional the best and the most effective power
sharing formula today.”
 
14
 
 Some three million copies of the manifesto were dis-
tributed to all BN election constituencies. Although BN campaigned through-
out the country, its electioneering effort was concentrated mainly in four states:
Kelantan, Terengganu, Perlis, and Kedah. The aim was to recapture Terengganu
and make significant inroads into Kelantan, most of which was lost to PAS in
the 1999 elections amid anger over the sacking and jailing of ex-Deputy Prime
Minister Anwar Ibrahim.
 
15
 
The two-party alliance Barisan Alternatif—composed of PAS and KeADILan—
issued its own joint election manifesto, titled “Together New Malaysia: Pros-
perity for All.” The 14-page pamphlet took a comprehensive stance covering
issues relating to rights, religion and culture, development, health, education,
 
13. BN, 
 
Toward a Malaysia of Excellence, Glory, and Distinction 
 
[2004 Elections Manifesto]
(Kuala Lumpur: Barisan Nasional, 2004).
14. Ibid., p. 6.
15. Anwar, sacked from UMNO, was sentenced in 1999 to six years in prison for corruption
and in 2000 to an additional nine years for sodomy, charges he denied and that many observers saw
as fabricated and politically inspired. A federal court freed Anwar in September 2004, overturning
the sodomy charges. However, he is barred from reentering partisan politics until 2008.
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business, employment, environment, and the future in a new Malaysia. The
manifesto defined Islam as a way of life for Muslims and upheld the religious
and cultural rights of non-Muslims. It promised to heed widespread calls for
abolition of the Internal Security Act and to end the practice of detention with-
out trial. Furthermore, the document offered to review all restrictive laws (such
as the Official Secrets Act, the Sedition Act, and the like) that it said were op-
pressive and violated basic human rights. BA’s platform would limit the prime
minister’s tenure to two five-year terms and bolster the business environment
by cutting bureaucracy and bringing the corporate income tax rate down to
20% from the existing 28%. For ordinary people, BA promised to abolish
highway tolls and cut vehicle prices by 10% from 2005, reduce electricity and
water charges, and offer free primary and secondary schooling to all Malay-
sians.
 
16
 
 The PAS president hoped that “the people will support us to form a
new Malaysia and ensure prosperity for all.”
 
17
 
 The opposition used the media,
 
Harakah, Suara PRM 
 
(Voices of PRM), 
 
Berita KeADILan 
 
(KeADILan News),
 
the Rocket
 
, and other means to present its side of the story. Most of the BA
message was negative, detailing what the alliance sees as the excesses of the
BN government but not indicating how the opposition plans to right the wrong.
For its part, DAP felt the country was facing “twin key challenges.” One
was to prevent the Islamic elements from turning Malaysia into an Islamic
state. The second was to bring about real and meaningful changes to the sys-
tem. DAP reiterated that an Islamic state is unsuitable for multireligious and
multiracial Malaysia because such a system would further divide Muslims from
non-Muslims, in addition to the 
 
bumiputra
 
/non-
 
bumiputra 
 
divide that already
exists.
 
18
 
 The choice in the general election was not between models of Islamic
states but to vote for the preservation of a secular democracy. DAP also argued
that although the new prime minister has brought about an air of change through
his promises to combat corruption, reduce red tape, and improve the quality of
the public service, the system has yet to see meaningful change. Therefore,
people were encouraged to vote for and strengthen DAP so that they could
monitor the implementation of the promises made by Abdullah Badawi. DAP
demanded fundamental changes to make Malaysia a truly democratic, free, and
just home for all.
 
19
 
16.
 
Manifesto Barisan Alternatif, 2004 
 
(Kuala Lumpur: Panel Manifesto PAS and KeADILan,
2004).
17.
 
Harakah
 
, April 1–15, 2004.
18.
 
Bumiputra 
 
(lit., son of the soil), refers to the Malays and natives of the Peninsula, Sabah,
and Sarawak. In 1969, as an immediate response to the ethnic Malay-Chinese riot of May 13, the
government introduced the New Economic Policy (NEP) to help the 
 
bumiputra
 
 compete econom-
ically with Chinese Malaysians.
19. “DAP Manifesto for General Election 2004,” 
 

 
http://www.dapmalaysia.org/election2004/
mani/mani-nat.htm
 

 
, accessed March 22, 2004.
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Islam: The Core Issue
 
The manifestos of the parties covered several issues. However, religion was
the core issue of this election, pitting the progressive approach adopted by Ab-
dullah Badawi and UMNO against the evidently narrow interpretation of Islam
by PAS and the secular democracy advocated by DAP. As the predominant
Malaysian Islamic party, PAS wants to make Malaysia an Islamic state; it ear-
lier passed the 
 
shari’ah
 
 criminal code (
 
hudud
 
) in the two states it controlled
but could not actually enforce the code. Generally, this is because 
 
hudud 
 
law
is unconstitutional: according to the Ninth Schedule of the Federal Constitu-
tion, the state government does not have the jurisdiction to impose 
 
hudud
 
; the
law overlaps with the Federal Penal Code; and its proposed punishments far
exceeded the limitations provided by the Shari’ah Courts (Criminal Jurisdic-
tion Act 1965, as amended in 1984).
 
20
 
 PAS adopted the slogan “Islam for All,”
which formed the theme of its separate manifesto for Terengganu. The mani-
festo stressed an administrative system based on the Qur’an, an economic pro-
gram run in accordance with Islam, and religious freedom for non-Muslims.
Mainstream newspapers carried news of PAS leaders suggesting that pro-
government voters would end up in hell. The party told voters to focus on the
hereafter. This apparently did not impress many voters, who wanted to know
what the candidates were going to do to help them break out of poverty, find
jobs, and develop their communities.
DAP took a totally opposite stand on the question of an Islamic state, saying
that such a transformation would be unconstitutional and would contravene
the social contract agreed upon by the founding fathers of Malaysia. The
founders agreed upon a Malaysia that is democratic, secular, multireligious,
tolerant, and progressive, with Islam as the official religion. DAP reiterated
that an Islamic state would be unsuitable for such a plural society because it
would create new cleavages while reinforcing existing ones. The party’s major
emphasis was to bury the question of an Islamic state once and for all.
 
21
 
Abdullah did not get involved in the debate over secularism versus Islam.
He was determined to respond to PAS and what is often seen as its adherence
to faith at the expense of human and national development. The prime minister
did not oppose mixing religion and politics. Rather, he was asking the people
to be religious but not to abandon their responsibilities in this world. His alter-
native of the moderate and progressive Islam Hadhari, which encouraged
Muslims to pursue knowledge, acquire science and technology, and get ahead
 
20. Muhammad Hashim Kamali, 
 
Punishment in Islamic Law: An Enquiry into the Hudud Bill
of Kelantan
 
 (Kuala Lumpur: Institute for Policy Research, 1995), pp. 11–18. The Shari’ah courts
apply Islamic personal laws in marriage, divorce, inheritance, and related areas to Muslims in
Malaysia.
21. “DAP Manifesto for General Election 2004.”
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has proved more attractive than the PAS alternative. Abdullah told farmers in
Kelantan that he had a “sacred obligation” to bring them development: “I want
to tell all Muslims, don’t be poor, don’t be backward, don’t be oppressed,
don’t be manipulated. Why live in poverty? It is shameful.”
 
22
 
 This sentiment
appealed not only to Malaysians’ sense of pride but also their common sense,
and proved to be popular.
 
The Results
 
In the run-up to the 2004 election, the EC did not reject nomination papers
on the basis of technical errors. However, 20 candidates were disqualified for
their inability to adhere to electoral regulations. One PAS parliamentary can-
didate was disqualified because he had been declared bankrupt. The BN candi-
date knew of the bankruptcy but mentioned it only during the brief nominating
period, making it impossible for PAS to find a replacement.
 
23
 
 Other candidates
either failed to pay a candidacy deposit or did not produce proper documents
on time.
A new rule enforced in this election provided for a withdrawal period of ap-
proximately three days. A total of 12 candidates withdrew from the race. In an
incident, two men were detained by the Anti-Corruption Agency for allegedly
trying to bribe an opposition candidate to withdraw so that the BN candidate
could win uncontested. The prime minister denounced the reported bribery at-
tempt and told the agency to handle the case according to the law.
 
24
 
 As a result
of withdrawal and disqualification, 17 parliamentary and 12 state seats were
won uncontested. All 17 parliamentary seats went to BN. Of the state seats, 11
were won uncontested by BN and one seat was won by PAS in Johor. This is the
first time in Malaysia’s political history that a PAS member will sit in the Johor
state assembly. In the final analysis, elections took place for 202 parliamentary
and 493 state assembly seats.
The elections were held as scheduled; candidates and their supporters ap-
parently adhered to laws and regulations. Police received 144 reports through-
out polling day, but none dealt with major untoward incidents.
 
25
 
 There were
nonetheless problems in some polling centers, mainly in Selangor, Sabah, and
Sarawak. Some voters complained that computers had broken down at some
centers; many voters reportedly refused to vote out of frustration.
Based on the latest verified electoral rolls, 10.28 million Malaysians were
eligible to vote. About 800,000 were first-time voters and another 200,700—
mainly army and police personnel—cast their absentee ballots by mail. Alto-
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gether some 7,500 polling stations were opened for a single day of voting
from 8 
 
A
 
.
 
M
 
. to 5 P.M.; results were declared within hours of the polls’ closing.
The government made use of technology in the electoral process. For instance,
registered voters could check via SMS to see if they were on the electoral
rolls, a process that takes a few seconds. Voter turnout ranged between 70%
and 85%. One parliamentary constituency (P125 in Putrajaya) registered a turn-
out of 91.79%. One state constituency (N21 in Telemung) in Terengganu reg-
istered a turnout of 90.33%. The turnout was higher in the peninsula than in
Sabah and Sarawak, where it ranged between 55% and 77%. The turnout figures
compare favorably with those in many Western democracies.
The election results took most Malaysians by surprise, including some top
UMNO leaders, who had not expected such a big win. The ruling BN coalition
won 90.4% of the seats in Parliament, its best showing since it was formed in
1974. BN won 62.37% of the total votes cast, up from 56.5% in 1999. It made
a clean sweep of all parliamentary seats in seven states, winning 198 seats and
scoring a nine-tenths majority (see Table 1). The coalition won 62.37% of the
popular vote—4,430,908 ballots out of a total 7.10 million who cast their
votes. The opposition taken together managed only 20 seats. One independent
candidate won a seat in Sabah. For the state assemblies, a state-by-state analy-
sis of the voting shows that BN won all but one seat each in Pahang, Perlis,
Johor, and Sabah. In another four states, BN conceded only two seats each to
the opposition. Surprisingly, BN recaptured the state of Terengganu from PAS
and almost won the state of Kelantan but for two seats.
The coalition’s key component, UMNO, performed extremely well, winning
92% of the seats it contested. Abdullah Badawi retained his parliamentary seat
for the seventh consecutive term with an increased majority of 18,122 votes.
His deputy, Najib Tun Razak, won his own parliamentary seat by a majority of
22,922 votes. In 1999, Najib had won his seat by a mere 241 votes. Most UMNO
candidates won by huge margins. UMNO’s success in attracting significant
Malay support was clearly noticeable in the state elections (see Table 2). In
Terengganu, UMNO won all eight parliamentary seats and 27 of the 32 state
seats, garnering 55% of popular votes, while MCA won one. In Kelantan, the
stronghold of PAS, UMNO received 49% of the votes and won 21 of the 45
state seats, as compared to two seats in 1999. In Kedah, UMNO won 14 of the
15 parliamentary and 31 of the 36 state assembly seats. Thus, UMNO ap-
peared to have won back some of the Malay support it lost in the 1999 elec-
tions. In the parliamentary seats, BN’s Chinese and Indian partners performed
well, with MCA winning 31 of 40 seats, Gerakan 10 of 12 seats, and MIC
winning all nine seats it contested. For the state seats, MCA won 75 of the 90
seats, MIC won all the 19 seats, and Gerakan won 30 of the 31 seats it con-
tested. Gerakan formed the state government in Penang, where it won the 13
seats it contested.
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PAS, which campaigned on the platforms “Islam for All” and “Power with
the Ulama” (Muslim religious scholars), suffered a crushing defeat. The party
had 26 members in the old 193-member parliament; now it has only seven in
the enlarged 219-seat Dewan Rakyat. Both the president and secretary-general
of PAS lost the parliamentary seats they contested. Worse still, PAS lost con-
trol of the state government in rural Terengganu. In Kelantan, PAS’s impreg-
nable stronghold, early unofficial results gave the impression that BN would
form the state government. In the event, after recounts, PAS won 24 of 45
seats, one with a mere two-vote majority, and formed the government. Nation-
ally, PAS garnered 1,075,517 votes or 15.01% of votes cast, almost identical
with the 15% it polled in 1999. In Kedah, where it was hoping to expand its
influence, PAS managed only five state seats as against 12 won in 1999. The
losses PAS suffered in the 2004 election showed that its 1999 gain stemmed
table 1 Parliamentary and State Seats Won by Political Parties in the 
2004 General Elections
Parliament State
States BN DAP PAS ADIL Ind. Total BN DAP PAS Ind. Total
Perlis 3 3 14 1 15
Kedah 14 1 15 31 5 36
Kelantan 9* 5* 14 21 24 45
Terengganu 8 8 28 4 32
Penang 8 4 1 13 38 1 1 40
Perak 21 3 24 52 7 59
Pahang 14 14 41 1 42
Selangor 22 22 54 2 56
Kuala Lumpur 7 4 11
Labuan 1 1
Putrajaya 1 1
Neg. Sembilan 8 8 34 2 36
Melaka 6 6 26 2 28
Johor 26 26 55 1 56
Sabah 24 1 25 59 1 60
Sarawak 27 1 28
Total 199 12 6 1 1 219 453 16 35 1 505
SOURCE: Authors’ calculation based on His Majesty’s Government Gazette (Kuala Lumpur:
Percetakan Nasional Malaysia Berhad, 2004), 48:8, April 12, 2004.
* Originally, the BN was declared to have won eight and PAS six of the parliamentary seats in
Kelantan. However, on June 23, 2004, the Kelantan High Court reversed one election result in the
Pasir Puteh constituency on the grounds that the EC had declared the wrong winner for the
constituency.
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largely from Malay dissatisfaction caused by the Anwar Ibrahim crisis and not
from PAS’s emphasis on hudud.
The PAS debacle in 2004 was attributable to the party’s aggressive style of
wooing voters by pushing for an Islamic state agenda with what many saw as
an undue emphasis on hudud and by branding an anti-PAS vote as an act of
apostasy. PAS is probably suffering from role confusion. It is a political party
with the professed aim of capturing power but it is acting like a religious orga-
nization interested in the invigoration of religious faith and re-creation of an
Islamic state. Apparently, many Malays do not endorse the kind of Islamic
state advocated by PAS. Most Malays are interested in policies aimed at
realizing social justice, eradicating poverty, promoting virtue, and prohibiting
vice in their society. To win elections, parties must, in addition to promising
spiritual welfare, serve the voters’ interest.
DAP, which was routed in the 1999 elections, improved its performance with
the reelection of party chairman Lim Kit Siang and his deputy, Karpal Singh.
Lim’s daughter-in-law also retained the state seat vacated by her husband,
table 2 Percentage of Votes by Political Parties in the Parliamentary 
Election
State Voters BN PAS ADIL DAP Others Ind. Turnout
Perlis 112,482 62.16 35.39 83.22
Kedah 821,901 58.43 27.77 11.58 80.99
Kelantan 662,722 49.02 37.42 9.87 1.16 80.40
Terengganu 455,924 55.21 37.43 5.15 87.93
Penang 672,362 55.57 3.74 12.01 26.43 76.04
Perak 1,170,351 57.17 13.63 7.88 17.29 70.08
Pahang 570,106 65.67 20.23 5.32 5.75 76.20
Selangor 1,422,274 63.96 13.87 12.61 6.81 0.35 72.95
FT KL 670,920 57.27 4.10 12.19 24.73 0.24 0.03 69.75
FT P/Jaya 5,079 87.64 11.58 91.79
N Sembilan 429,786 67.16 9.83 6.18 12.92 73.36
Melaka 345,917 69.23 5.74 7.63 14.05 78.94
Johor 1,184,788 77.14 9.35 3.67 6.77 73.51
FT Labuan 22,006 75.11 21.58 67.08
Sabah 512,490 62.08 11.38 2.57 0.33 19.30 65.03
Sarawak 695,969 64.61 0.24 1.25 15.67 8.07 8.23 62.03
Total 9,755,077 62.05 15.01 8.37 9.74 0.53 1.52 73.92
SOURCE: Ibid. to Table 1.
NOTE: Column “Others” includes MDP, SETIA, PASOK (Persatuan Kebangsaan Pasok
Nunukragang Bersatu, United Pasok Nunukragang National Organization), SNAP, and STAR.
Table 2 excludes the 2.29% of rejected and 0.49% of unreturned votes.
ABDUL RASHID MOTEN AND TUNKU MOHAR MOKHTAR 333
Lim Guan Eng, who could not contest. Former head of DAP Socialist Youth
(DAPSY), he was imprisoned from August 1998 to August 1999 under the
Sedition Act and Printing Presses and Publications Act for allegedly making
false accusations against the then-chief minister of Melaka, incriminating the
latter in statutory rape. Under Malaysian law, convicted criminals cannot run
for political office within five years of their release from prison. DAP won 12
parliamentary and 15 state seats and collected 694,575 votes, 9.78% of the
total. DAP’s best performance was in the state of Perak, where it won three
parliamentary and seven state seats. The party’s decision to break away from
the PAS-led opposition front (BA) and distance itself from PAS and its Islamic
state ideology seems to have helped PAS to perform relatively better in Pe-
nang and Perak. The success is also partly attributable to the DAP’s “soft ap-
proach” of pleading with voters to give it a chance so the party could ensure
checks and balances in government and make sure that the prime minister’s
anti-corruption and development programs do not falter.26
KeADILan, the torchbearer of secular democratic governance, won only
one seat, securing 587,776 votes or 8.27% of the popular vote. In 1999, it had
secured a very respectable 11.54%. In 2004, following five recounts, KeADI-
Lan president Wan Azizah Wan Ismail, who was declared to have lost in the
first count, retained her seat with a majority of only 590 votes; the final count
was done with a ring of police deployed around the counting center. All of the
party’s remaining 58 candidates lost. KeADILan’s poor performance derived
also from the fact that Abdullah Badawi has shown seriousness in implement-
ing policies advocated by KeADILan such as fighting corruption and crime
and providing greater social security. The opposition’s performance is yet an-
other indicator of several important trends: withering support for the “Islamic
State” concept, paralysis of the reformasi (reform) movement that had led to
the formation of KeADILan, and fading support for Anwar Ibrahim.
The opposition parties believe that they would have won many more seats
had the 2004 elections been free and fair in terms of equal access to the media,
use of governmental resources, and impartial election administration. The op-
position newspaper Harakah described the poll as the “weirdest, dirtiest and
most undemocratic of all elections held in Malaysia since independence.”27
Lim Kit Siang, DAP’s chairman, told reporters, “I call on Abdul Rashid [the
EC chairman] to resign with dignity because the conduct of this general election
is the worst in the history of the country’s democratic system.”28 Among the
26. The DAP deputy chairman said: “There is no doubt that the Barisan Nasional will form the
Government, but we are going along the lines that DAP should be a strong opposition to ensure
check and balance.” See ibid., March 18, 2004.
27. Harakah, April 16–30, 2004.
28. New Straits Times, March 22, 2004.
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problems reported were the absence of voters’ names from some electoral rolls;
the existence of “phantom” or unqualified voters; a two-hour extension of the
voting period in Selangor; misassignment of a party logo on the ballot paper in
one state constituency in Pahang, which led to re-polling; and the wrongful
switch of ballot papers in two state constituencies in Melaka. The process of
recounting votes was also noticeably slow because of new election rules.
The problem in Selangor stemmed from a delayed start—to 3 P.M.—to vot-
ing in some areas. To compensate, the EC extended the voting period for two
hours in the state. The EC chairman took the blame for the glitch but main-
tained that the election’s problems were ones of implementation, not deliberate
policies. In reaction PAS and KeADILan jointly lodged a preliminary com-
plaint with the Human Rights Commission over what they asserted were irreg-
ularities: the existence of two separate electoral rolls, which confused voters
and candidates; repetition of voter names at different polling stations; removal
of names from the electoral rolls; and delays in handing over the electoral roll
to opposition parties for checking. The opposition parties called on the EC to
suspend the publication of election results until investigations into the alleged
irregularities were carried out. Opposition officials submitted a memorandum
urging the king and state rulers not to assent to the formation of the federal
and state governments, especially in Terengganu, which was governed by PAS.
They also called for fresh elections to be held and handled by a truly independent
election commission.29
The Badawi Factor
One reason cited for the success of BN is the personality of Prime Minister
Abdullah Badawi, known as “the Badawi factor.” According to BN’s secretary-
general, success in the election was “99.9% due to Abdullah Badawi.”30 The
prime minister, aged 63, was born into a prominent family in the northern state
of Penang. After taking a degree in Islamic studies and a period working in the
civil service, he entered politics upon his father’s death and was elected to
Parliament in 1978. He quickly rose to prominence, holding the jobs of minis-
ter of education and defense before being appointed foreign minister in 1991.
In 1999, he was made deputy prime minister after his predecessor, Anwar
Ibrahim, was sacked.
Most observers of Malaysian government and politics concur that since he
became prime minister, Abdullah Badawi has endeared himself to the public
through words and actions. He has addressed the festering issue of graft with
high-profile prosecutions. Eric Chia, a multimillionaire, was arrested and charged
29. Star, March 24, 2004; Harakah, April 16–30, 2004.
30. Star, March 22, 2004.
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with criminal breach of trust amounting to RM 76.4 million ($20.3 million)
while he was head of Perwaja Steel Bhd. (As of this writing, the case was con-
tinuing.) Land and Cooperation Minister Kasitah Gaddam was charged with
corruption involving RM 3.6 million ($900,000) and subsequently resigned.
Abdullah also rekindled some faith in the police through the establishment
of a Royal Commission of Inquiry into the police force. For the past decade,
the force has come under heavy criticism for its lack of transparency, excessive
use of force, ill-treatment of suspects and detainees, and high levels of corrup-
tion. Several high-ranking policemen are known to have been involved with
the criminal underworld. The commission consists of members from the gov-
ernment, civil society, and opposition party representatives. The prime minis-
ter’s appointments of a new inspector-general of police and his deputy were
also well received. Abdullah has made anti-corruption a pillar of his adminis-
tration: in a speech to elite civil servants, he named combating corruption and
red tape as his priorities. His surprise visit to an immigration center in Kuala
Lumpur to check on this notoriously slow department created the impression
that he is also serious about inefficiency. He has worked to improve public de-
livery systems, cutting red tape and increasing efficiency in the public sector,
applying prudent fiscal management by canceling high-cost projects, and
boosting the agricultural sector to create more sources of wealth.
Polls conducted a week prior to the 2004 election indicate that people were
generally pleased with the arrest of high-profile individuals and others on charges
of corruption. There has been neither a personal attack on any opposition leader
nor abrasive confrontation with any group by Abdullah and BN leaders during
the election period. A survey conducted after the elections by the independent
Merdeka Center for Opinion Research found that 42% of 1,017 respondents
voted for BN because of its promise for material development. The survey
also found that “32 percent of the respondents chose to describe [Abdullah] as
a ‘man of the people’ while 22 percent described him as having a ‘clean image.’
Another 19 percent saw him in the context of his religious background.”31
Faced with a prime minister with equally strong Islamic credentials and greater
acceptability among Malaysians, the opposition PAS resorted to personal at-
tacks on Abdullah and his family. Members accused Abdullah of preaching Is-
lamic virtue only when it suited him and criticized him for not leading funeral
rites for his mother. Harakah, similarly attacked Abdullah and his family and
mocked Abdullah’s Islamic credentials, especially for not leading his mother’s
funeral prayer. It also tried to revive the groundswell of public opinion regard-
ing the Anwar issue by showing pictures of Anwar Ibrahim’s black eye and his
31. Pauline Puah, “Survey Confirms ‘Pak Lah Factor’ in BN Polls Victory,” in http://www.
malaysiakini.com, accessed September 19, 2004.
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wife and daughters on the campaign trail.32 PAS president Abdul Hadi Awang
was much more aggressive toward Abdullah and the UMNO leadership, ac-
cusing them of paying lip service to Islam. Hadi’s strident condemnation of
Abdullah did not find favor with Malaysians at large and adversely affected
Hadi’s and PAS’s public image. After the first few days, Hadi changed his tone
and focused on accusing the BN government of abuses, injustice in relation to
Anwar, and other issues, but it was too late.
In contrast, Abdullah adopted a non-confrontational approach that was at-
tuned to Malaysia’s political culture. His appeal to the country had been “trust
me” rather than “trust my government.” His campaign themes have been prom-
ises to curb corruption and lead Malaysia toward “Excellence, Glory, and Dis-
tinction.” His religious credibility—seen as genuine by many—also neutralized
Anwar’s carefully cultivated image as a modern Muslim leader, a champion of
the Islamic and developing world.
The Buoyant Economy
BN’s win was also partly attributable to the buoyant Malaysian economy,
which has recorded impressive growth since 1999. In 2003, the economy per-
formed surprisingly well despite the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syn-
drome (SARS) in the middle of the year. Inflation remained relatively low at
1.2% and the unemployment rate stands at about 3.8%. The manufacturing
sector registered the strongest growth at 6.5%, followed by mining (4.5%) and
services (4.2%).33
Prime Minister Abdullah has continued most of his predecessor’s economic
policies. One obvious divergence was Abdullah’s plan to improve the agricul-
tural sector as one of the engines of economic growth. In a small cabinet re-
shuffle after becoming prime minister, Abdullah appointed Nor Muhammad
Yaakob, then economic advisor to the government, as his second finance min-
ister. Abdullah himself is the finance minister. Nor Yaakob was credited for
implementing unorthodox economic policies such as currency and capital con-
trols as responses to the Asian financial crisis that hit Malaysia in 1997–98.
Several economic indicators work in the government’s—and thus the ruling
party’s—favor. On February 25, 2004, Bank Negara (the central bank) announced
Malaysia’s economic performance for 2003 in which the gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) grew by 5.2%, better than the government’s initial forecast of 4.5%.34
32. While in police custody in 1998, Anwar was beaten by Inspector General of Police Abdul
Rahim Noor, who later confessed, was convicted by a court, and apologized as demanded by Anwar
Ibrahim. The image of Anwar’s black eye became the symbol of reformasi in 1999.
33. “Budget 2004: Building on Success, Investing for the Future,” http://www.nst.com.my/
Current_News/NST/Saturday/Columns/200309130952/Artic, accessed March 18, 2004.
34. Star, February 26, 2004.
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This growth was founded on higher consumer spending, soaring exports fueled
by the manufacturing sector, and stronger growth in investments. In addition
to boasting the best GDP growth since the financial crisis, Malaysia also re-
corded impressive gains on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange composite index.
On March 18, 2004, the composite index breached the 900-point mark to close
at 901.47, the highest close in four years. A day later, the last market trading
day before the elections, the index closed at 904.45. This impressive gain,
though quite normal before Malaysia’s general elections, indicated investors’
confidence in the government’s economic policies.
The 3Ms
Indeed, BN has also benefited considerably from the old 3Ms: money, ma-
chinery, and media. BN has a lot of money that its candidates have spent with-
out limits. The opposition, all along, has been accusing BN of buying votes.
The ruling BN has used its resources for electoral advantage, often employing
the BN machinery to keep the voters in a “feel good” mode. All over the coun-
try, roads were resurfaced. Schools, communities, and individuals received grants,
awards, and assistance. No such advantages of the politics of “feel good” accrued
to the opposition.
Moreover, BN’s electoral machinery is generally superior to that of the op-
position. With the even shorter campaign period, this advantage became deci-
sive. What observers of government and politics in Malaysia have often ignored
is that BN is a coalition of 14 political parties and therefore BN campaigns are
carried out by 14 parties under the same label.
The most decisive of the three factors is BN’s control of the media. In re-
cent years, the Malaysian Chinese Association, one of the key players in the
coalition, has secured direct control of the newspapers Nanyang Siang Pao
and China Press, making BN’s control of the broadcast and daily print media
complete. The Merdeka Center survey found that nearly two-thirds of 1,017
respondents viewed media coverage during the elections as being biased in
favor of the ruling party. Forty-five percent of respondents reported that they
were influenced by the mass media.35 By contrast, the opposition only pub-
lishes its bimonthly party papers, which cannot legally be sold to non-members.
However, this law is not strictly enforced. Opposition parties argue that the
governing coalition’s control over the media and other instruments of power
is unfair. The BN-owned or -controlled mass media have systematically pro-
jected PAS as being discriminatory toward women, fixated with segregation
of the sexes, and desirous of curbing so-called un-Islamic forms of dress and
35. Pauline Puah, “Survey: Media Coverage of Elections Slanted,” in http://www.malaysiakini.
com, accessed September 21, 2004.
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entertainment. During the eight-day campaign, BN bombarded the electorate
with approximately 1,000 pages of full-page advertisements. In contrast, news-
papers refused to run all but a few of the opposition advertisements, and even
then these were heavily edited.
Fractured Opposition
A final factor that contributed to BN’s landslide is the weakness of the opposi-
tion. The BA that performed well during the 1999 elections could not continue
to work as a team. PAS suffered from the death in June 2002 of its leader
Fadzil Noor, a close friend and comrade of Anwar Ibrahim. Fadzil Noor was
instrumental in bringing PAS and KeADILan together. He was succeeded by
Abdul Hadi Awang, who shares little with Anwar Ibrahim or his cause. Conse-
quently, the once-highly publicized cordiality between PAS and KeADILan
gradually waned. Barely months after the 1999 elections, DAP parted acrimo-
niously with PAS, unwilling to accept the latter’s insistence on establishing an
Islamic state in Malaysia. The withdrawal of DAP from BA and the unnecessary,
acrimonious public negotiations only made things worse. The BN-controlled
media have been quick to take advantage of the opposition’s weaknesses. DAP
also became estranged from KeADILan, accusing the party of trying to impose
its will on DAP members. In several constituencies, DAP and KeADILan fielded
candidates opposing each other.
KeADILan, once considered a viable alternative to UMNO, was suffering
from financial difficulties and mass defections. A total of 130 members, in-
cluding state and divisional leaders, crossed over to UMNO in December 2003
and February 2004 as the party’s president admitted to the organization’s fi-
nancial difficulties. KeADILan received a jolt when three of its senior leaders
were ruled ineligible for the general election. Article 48 of the Federal Consti-
tution bars from running those who have been sentenced to one year or more
in jail or who have been fined at least RM 2,000 ($530). Invoking the article,
the EC disqualified the vice president, youth chief, and deputy women’s chief
because of their criminal convictions.36 The close relationship between PAS
and KeADILan also suffered because of squabbling over seats.
In contrast, the 14-member BN maintained a multiethnic front and appeared
united. Many of its intra-party squabbles have been resolved, at least tempo-
rarily. The relatively smooth transition from Dr. Mahathir to Abdullah Badawi
has also enhanced the image of the ruling coalition in the eyes of the Malaysian
public.
36. Star, March 5, 2004. These convictions were mainly political: the vice president was con-
victed of making false declarations relating to Anwar’s case, the youth chief for his exposure of
official government documents implicating a minister in corruption, and the women’s deputy chief
for making alleged false statements on the government’s mistreatment of illegal immigrants.
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Finally, the opposition, specifically PAS, also suffered because of the Sep-
tember 11, 2001, incident, which was followed by the U.S. invasions of Af-
ghanistan and later Iraq, and several incidents of bombings by Islamic radicals
in Southeast Asia. As a result of these developments, further anxieties have
developed, especially among non-Muslims, about political Islam. The dramatic
change in the international political climate, the hype over terrorism, and the
loss of lives in the Southeast Asia bombings have adversely affected opposi-
tion politics in Malaysia. The result has been heightened fear of PAS’s inten-
tions among some Malaysians, particularly non-Muslims. The anxieties have
persisted because PAS, instead of adopting and publicizing its developmental
policies, has focused its attention on introducing hudud and qisas [retaliatory]
laws and Islamic rule generally in Terengganu. The sudden death of PAS leader
Fadzil Noor, popularly regarded as more approachable and open-minded, and
his replacement by Abdul Hadi Awang, considered more aloof, combative,
and close-minded, reinforced these negative impressions of PAS.37
Conclusion
The eleventh general elections in Malaysia once again demonstrated the
strength of BN in the electoral arena. It won a nine-tenths majority in par-
liament, recaptured the state of Terengganu, and made significant inroads in
Kelantan, the Malay heartland in the northeast. The polls were conducted rela-
tively smoothly. However, the elections were also lopsided, in the sense that
the media—television and radio—and the press as represented by the leading
national dailies played a totally partisan role. The major media outlets, con-
trolled by BN partners, gave pro-BN, anti-BA messages. The opposition received
scant if any mention. There were also serious allegations of vote-buying, cor-
ruption, and vote-rigging. A comprehensive reform program will be necessary
to combat all allegations of malpractice before democracy in Malaysia can be
considered stable.
In the meantime, the 2004 elections demonstrate that Abdullah Badawi had
proven himself. His fight against corruption; insistence on public accountability;
and shift from corporate mega-projects to emphasis on agro-based, rural projects,
as well as his moderate Islamic stance and inclusive multiracial approach went
down very well with every community of the Malaysian electorate—and that
support translated into votes. A number of factors were in Badawi’s favor, in-
cluding the rapid growth of the economy and the fractured opposition. PAS lost
its control of Terengganu state and was severely weakened in Kelantan; its
37. Hadi Awang claimed that the United States was protecting Abdullah because it feared PAS
coming to power and that the U.S. “will never allow the establishment of an Islamic government
anywhere.” See Harakah, March 16–31, 2004.
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advocacy of, and attempts at, establishing an Islamic state has been seriously
undermined.
Some opposition leaders have alleged that irregularities in the elections, as
well as redrawing of electoral boundaries to BN’s benefit, contributed to the
opposition defeat. They also accused the weak EC for its inability to curb ram-
pant violations of election laws. An investigation and rectification of alleged
irregularities would certainly revive people’s confidence in Malaysian democ-
racy. Following the EC’s publication of elections totals, 40 petitions were filed
by various parties to challenge the results. Of all the petitions, only a result in
the parliamentary seat in Kelantan was overturned, where BN was declared
the winner following an apparent mistake by the EC. Accordingly, BN’s par-
liamentary seats increased to 199, while PAS’s were reduced to just six. All
other petitions in Kelantan and nine petitions in Terengganu were rejected by
the respective state courts.
In sum, the 2004 general elections were an endorsement of Prime Minister
Abdullah Ahmad Badawi’s style of moderate governance. These were his first
elections as prime minister, conducted after he had been in office for only four
months and 21 days. Abdullah was Barisan’s selling point. He managed to re-
capture most Malay constituencies won by PAS and KeADILan in 1999. He
asked for, and received, a big mandate: the swing to the government repre-
sents a personal vote of confidence in Abdullah and an endorsement of his
vision of Malaysia’s future.
